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The debate about Britain's entry into the Common Market has, at least in Britain
herself, tended to focus on such relatively short-term matters as the cost of living and
other immediate economic effects or the changes it would make in detailed aspects
of the British way of life. This kind of debate is no doubt necessary and useful.
After all, the short-term effects are not only the ones which have the most noticeable
impact but ultimately become long-term ones. Nevertheless, this kind of debate
ignores the very considerable changes which have been taking place steadily in the
years-indeed decades-since the Second World War. British entry into the Common
Market can be understood only in the longer-term perspective of British experience
over this period and in the light of what we can expect in the future. We have to
look at both the historical events and processes which brought us to our present situation and the prospects which are open to us.
To see how we got where we are now, we must go back nearly three decades
and look at our position in 1945. Our future then was surely the least clearly charted
of all the major participants in the Second World War, whether victors or vanquished.
The United States and the Soviet Union were secure as superpowers. Germany,
Japan, and Italy were all defeated and reconstruction had to be their single-minded
aim. France had also been defeated; and while she, too, had overseas responsibilities,
she had inevitably sacrificed less in an economic sense than we. We, having seen the
war through from 194r to a victorious conclusion and having borne the burden of it
alone from the fall of France until 1941, outwardly looked extremely powerful. With
armies spread around the world we could be forgiven if we thought that the British
Empire was at the height of its strength.
But even in the years immediately after the war, the strains were beginning to
show. The burden of fighting the Communists in Greece grew too heavy for us and
we passed it to the United States. We found ourselves unable to solve the Palestine
problem. We found that even as an apparently powerful victor-nation, unlike the
United States and even the Soviet Union, our power had been undermined by the
sacrifices of the war. We were, of course, a much smaller country than either of
these; but, in addition, we continued to bear a combination of burdens which were
too much for us.
The burden of debt was a crushing one. To finance the war we had liquidated
most of our very considerable foreign assets and, because most of our production had
to go into the war effort rather than exports, had accumulated huge debts arising
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out of the imports of the raw materials on which we had depended. Those debts
remain with us today in the shape of the sterling balances. Their composition and
ownership have changed, but the fact remains that we have never been able to repay
the debts accumulated in the common defence.
Our economy was gravely weakened by the obsolescence of our industry which
during the war had neither the funds nor the capacity to set aside resources for
industrial replacement.
To compound our burden, the military commitments which we assumed around
the world were greater even' than those of the superpowers. Over the years they
have proved extremely expensive. Of course it was not only military victory, but also
our own traditions and habits of thought which prevented us from curtailing these
responsibilities, or questioning the belief that it was natural for us to police large
parts of the world and to defend countries far away.
Thus, in the first decade after the war we found ourselves preoccupied with many
problems and responsibilities which left us little time or inclination to wonder whether
our world could continue for long. The conversion of our Empire into the new
concept of a Commonwealth of Nations held the attention of governments and
people alike. Looking back, it was surely something of an achievement successfully
and, on the whole, peacefully to bring to independence a large number of countries
which remain our friends to this day. If some people accused us of taking too long
in doing this and condemned us as out-of-date colonialists, we found the justification
for our policy in the Belgian Congo, where we saw what a premature withdrawal from
responsibility could produce. We believed in the Commonwealth ideal, the ideal of
a like-minded group of nations brought up in the British connection which could
be a force for peace and progress and on which our foreign policy and our influence
in the world could be based.
But the world around us was changing in ways which were not compatible with
our view of ourselves. The superpowers continued to grow in strength relative to
the other countries of the world, including ourselves. Devastated Europe went through
a period of reconstruction with generous American aid and the first moves towards
Western European unity were made. The division between Eastern and Western
Europe was formalized and we encouraged, if we did not join, the defence aspects
of European integration because of the Soviet threat. But we refused to join in the
moves towards European political unity because our main interests still seemed to
lie in the Commonwealth and in our relations with our close wartime Western
ally, the United States. After the collapse of the European Defence Community in
1952, Europe moved toward the Treaty of Rome. We took no part in this process.
Indeed, all our attempts were directed at including ourselves in a free trade area
covering all of Western Europe which the Six countries of the new EEC saw as
attenuating their ideal of political unity. They rejected our advances. Even as we
formed the European Free Trade Area of the seven in parallel to the EEC of the
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Six, it was already clear that we should have to think again about our European
policies.
There were other developments in the world which we could not ignore if we
were not to find events passing us by. The volume of world trade was increasing
far more between the industrial nations themselves than between developed and
developing countries. We found that our own trade was more important with the
United States, with Europe, even with industrialized South Africa, than with the
less developed countries of the Commonwealth. As a medium-sized, industrialized
European country it became increasingly plain that we could not base our foreign
policy on a Commonwealth of independent countries in the way that formerly we
could on a united British Empire. The newly independent countries were too
diverse, too separated--each with their own regional interests and their own governments of varying political persuasions-to cooperate with or even be sympathetic
to our major international preoccupations (for example, the Atlantic Alliance and the
East-West confrontation in Europe). Similarly, our major security interests made it
difficult for us to share their attitudes of non-alignment; and our weak economy,
impossible to help them with economic aid to the extent they demanded. In addition, divisive issues within the Commonwealth-such as the controversy in IndiaPakistan and apartheid in South Africa and, in recent years, Rhodesia-have shown
how impracticable it is to think of the Commonwealth as a political unit.
And so, at the end of the 195o's, we found ourselves with a proud past but no
clearly discernible future. For too long we had tried to fulfill the role of the third
of the great powers, only to find that economically we could not manage it. In size
and population we were a middle-range power, not a great one; we were comparable
to our European neighbours and not the United States or the Soviet Union. In
Dean Acheson's now famous words, we had lost an Empire but not yet found a
role. The recent past had shown what we could not do. A look into the expected
future showed the rather limited choice that lay before us. It is worth outlining
some of the assumptions about this future, against the background of which we had
to make our decision.
The first reasonable assumption was the position of the superpowers. Of these,
we could be confident that the United States would remain the world's strongest
power and would increase its lead over individual European countries. It would
no doubt also continue the increasingly evident trend of being preoccupied with
domestic concerns and under increasing pressure to cut back overseas commitments.
The Soviet Union, while preoccupied with China, would maintain, or try to
maintain, a tight hold over Eastern Europe. Although today it is unfashionable to
say so, we must expect it to remain a Soviet objective to weaken Western Europe,
forestall its integration, and encourage the destruction of links between Western
Europe and the United States.
With regard to Western Europe, there could be no doubt that the dominating
factor in the next decades would be the EC. Within the existing EEC, Germany was
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already becoming the most powerful member, at least economically. In the rest of the
world, China would come out of its isolation; and Japan would forge a new and
more self-confident identity. The Commonwealth would continue to be a group of
countries, bound together by historical, economic, and other ties, which would find
it useful to discuss world problems. But the Commonwealth countries would be no
more able in the coming period than they had been in the past to produce a concerted line of action or protect their interests as a group vis-a-vis the rest of the
world.
In the economic sphere, world trade would continue to grow, if more slowly than
in the recent past. Countries, or groups of countries, with large markets and largescale resources and investment capabilities would expand at a faster rate and become
economically stronger than countries less well placed.
Against this background, the real choice facing us was whether to continue
as we were, trying to maintain the existing pattern of international relationships,
or to join the European Economic Community. Other alternatives which have been
canvassed have not proven realistic on examination. Basing ourselves on the Commonwealth has already shown itself not to be a viable choice. A North Atlantic Free
Trade Area has sometimes been advocated but the concept is vague, including as it
sometimes does even Japan and Australia. Even if such a proposal were viable on
economic grounds, it lacks the element of political cohesion necessary to counter-

balance the fact that we are smaller than the major countries or groups we should
be dealing with inside and outside a NAFTA. With the political dimension missing,
the idea has always lacked appeal, and it has never got off the ground as a serious
alternative.
Thus, joining the Common Market seemed the only sensible answer. We naturally
expected to benefit from membership. We expected and expect the economic benefits
of increased scale-a reference not only to the size of the market, but also to greater
market stability, greater growth, and greater access to the scale of resources needed
in modern technology than we have been able to provide for ourselves.
But important as these economic benefits are, even more important is the fact
that membership would give us an influence which we would not otherwise have
in the development of Europe itself and of Europe's relations with other parts of the
world. What is at stake here are Britain's own relations for the foreseeable future
with her closest neighbours as well as the future relations of Western Europe with
the superpowers, with the developing world, with Japan and China; these relationships will involve major issues of international trade and finance as well as the
central issues of war and peace. All these fields would be of great concern to us

whether we were members of the Common Market or not, both because of their
direct effect on Britain and because they would shape the world we should be living
in. But Britain has half the population of Japan, a third that of the EEC, a quarter

that of the United States. A country of fifty-five million people could not be in a
strong position to influence these events where the other chief participants were major
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economic and political entities like the United States, the Soviet Union, the EEC,
Japan, and perhaps China. We should be far better placed to help shape our own
future as a major member of a strong European Community than as a relatively
small country independently attempting to protect our interests.
For all of these reasons successive British governments, starting more than ten
years ago, decided that we should throw in our lot with the European Communities.
In the best of all possible worlds, there would have been no price to pay nor risks
to take either by us or by any of our friends. This being a less than perfect world, we
have had to settle for less than the ideal; but through the skill of our negotiators
and through the keenness of our European friends to have us in, we have emerged
with a generally good deal for everybody, including our traditional Commonwealth
trading partners, particularly New Zealand and the Caribbean sugar-producing countries, for whom reasonable and continuing access to the British market was the
only alternative to serious economic problems amounting in some cases to disaster.
It is a very dubious argument that we as a country should sacrifice our own future
because we obtained only a good, and not the best possible, result for our friends.
Just as many people in Commonwealth countries have always been anxious
about British entry into the EEC, Americans have generally-perhaps instinctively
-supported it. Conceivably this support rests on the somewhat misleading analogy
of the federation of the United States of America. But now that entry has become a
reality, it is no secret that many people in the United States have also started to
question whether the Common Market and its enlargement are such a good thing
after all. Many of these questions relate to its short-term impact effect. It is now
time to turn to some of these doubts which have been expressed in recent months.
The Common Market is sometimes held to be economically damaging to other
countries. It is true that change inevitably does cause some problems of readjustment, but the matter must be kept in perspective. Experience to date has been that
the Common Market has greatly increased overall trade with other countries and
most notably with the United States. In fact, trade between the Common Market
and the United States has tripled since the Common Market was founded in 1958,
and it is still growing rapidly. As a percentage of total United States exports,
exports to the Six increased from sixteen per cent in 1958 to 19.5 per cent in 1970.
Even in the sensitive area of agriculture the United States exports in 197o matched
the peak figures for 1966, increased by $243 million in 1971, and were considerably
greater than the figures for pre-Common Market days. Agricultural exports vary
from year to year, but United States agricultural exports to the Six which were about
$8oo million in 1958, reached the level of more than $1.5 billion in 1970. It was widely
argued that 197o represented a freak high. Now, USDA figures released in February,
1972, indicate a record level of $1.83 billion in 1971. It would be difficult to show
that United States agriculture as a whole, even in the worse years, has suffered
from the Common Market since the Six have consistently taken around the same
proportion, about twenty-two per cent to twenty-three per cent, of all United States
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agricultural exports. British accession to the Community, by the lowering of our
average industrial tariffs by about a fifth to the Common Market level-which is
already substantially below the United States level-and by increasing our rate of
growth and therefore demand for imports, can also be expected to provide further
opportunities for increased trade.
Two particular problems which have worried some of our friends about the
Common Market and about our entry into it are the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) and the question of special trading arrangements with third countries.
Although United States agricultural exports overall have not suffered, the CAP is
seen as a threat to some sectors of American agricultural exports. The fact is that
with fourteen per cent of the Community's population on the land, many in farms
which are too small and too inefficient to be competitive, the member countries are
faced with immense social and political problems which cannot, in demooratic countries, be solved by hard doctrines of laissez faire economics. They are much the same
problems as the United States faced in the i95o's. It is easy for those who already
have an efficient agriculture, as both the United States and Britain have, to criticize
those who are still seeking a solution. But a solution is on the way; the member
governments of the Community are doing a great deal to modernize and rationalize
farming in Europe. Fourteen per cent of the population on the land is already
a considerable reduction of the twenty-five per cent of fifteen years ago. As for the
trading and association arrangements entered into by the Common Market, criticisms
here often do not recognize the real problems of the developing countries which many
of these arrangements are designed to meet. Britain is as committed to the principles
of multilateral trade as anybody, but we also have a direct responsibility toward
developing Commonwealth countries, who depend for their livelihood on access to
the British market and for whom there are no alternative markets. This is why we
insisted that the enlarged Community should assume responsibility for the developing Commonwealth just as it has for the overseas partners of the present members.
The European Community has already done much to eliminate the traditional
divisions and weaknesses which so bedevilled Europe in the past. The enlarged Community consolidates this process, removes a cause of tension and potential instability
in Europe and forestalls the resurgence of old enmities and tempting opportunities
for mischiefmaking and disintegration on the part of those who do not wish us well.
It also opens up whole new perspectives in diplomacy and defence.
With political cohesion and unity, we in Europe should be able to bear a greater
share of the common burden of defence. A start has already been made by increased
European contributions to the common defence through the so-called European
Defence Improvement Program and other measures. Major developments cannot
happen overnight since we shall still be a collection of ten individual countries.
But with the central issue of enlargement now decided, we should certainly hope
to find the necessary political will to establish new ways of working together, new
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means of coordinating our resources, and new possibilities commensurate with our
political and economic potentialities.
Political strength in Europe, based on the economic union provided by the
Common Market and the political cohesion which will go with it, can also be
expected to contribute to the improvement of East-West relations. The Soviet Union
has consistently opposed greater unity in Western Europe precisely because fragmentation would have increased their opportunities to exploit our weaknesses.
Western Europe cannot face the East with real self-confidence so long as it is
disunited. A viable union of Western Europe, on the other hand, can provide a
firmer basis for real relaxation of tension with the Communist world and for a
balanced reduction of the armaments which at present lay so heavy a burden on both
sides.
With President Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow, it is hardly necessary to
catalogue the changes and the evolution which are taking place in international
relationships. We in Europe have contributed to these changes, but we have also
foreseen them, in general if not in detail, and helped to make them constructive. In
doing so it can fairly be said that we are keeping the best of the old relationships
in forming the new ones.
In some ways the enlarged EEC may be a more difficult partner for the United
States to deal with. Cooperation on a basis of equality is also liable to mean less
chance of one partner getting his way all the time. Nevertheless, the cooperation is
more effective and the partnership stronger. Events since August, 1971, have demonstrated both the differences that can arise and our continued interdependence,
not to mention the dependence of the rest of the world on our success in coping
with our problems. President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report for 1972 expresses the
consequences of what he calls the "striking change in political as well as economic
relations across the Atlantic." It shows also where all our interests lie. He said:
The United States is realistic. This change means the end of American tutelage
and the end of the era of automatic unity. But discord is not inevitable either. The
challenge to our maturity and political skill is to establish a new practice in Atlantic unity-finding common ground in a consensus of independent policies instead
of in deference to American prescriptions.
This essential harmony of our purposes is the enduring link between a uniting
Europe and the United States. This is why we have always favored European
unity and why we welcome its growth not only in geographical area but into new
spheres of policy ....
Two strong powers in the West would add flexibility to
Western diplomacy, and could increasingly share the responsibilities of decision ....
As this political will develops, it will facilitate cooperation in the wider Atlantic
relationship.

